We agree with Dumont and Robertson (1) that the design of nervous systems is not necessarily optimal. That teleology has no place in the consideration of biological design is at the very heart of modern evolutionary theory. However, we take exception to several aspects of their article. (i) Their premise that the study of simple circuits and behaviors has been slow to lead to any fundamental principles of neural function does an injustice to the biologists who work on these systems (2) To gain a better understanding of the forces that shape neural systems, we must have more comparative studies of invertebrate neural circuits aimed at identifying similarities and differences occurring at the order, family, and generic levels (6). Ideally these studies would use systems that have already been thoroughly studied in one or a few species. Also, we must continue to build our understanding of the rules governing development in invertebrate nervous systems. The nervous systems of animals and humans are extremely complex, and we will not obtain our knowledge ofthe underlying organizational processes easily. Nevertheless, only through the continued study of living systems can we hope to comprehend how neural circuits are shaped by natural selection.
Neuronal Circuits and Evolution
We agree with Dumont and Robertson (1) that the design of nervous systems is not necessarily optimal. That teleology has no place in the consideration of biological design is at the very heart of modern evolutionary theory. However, we take exception to several aspects of their article. (i) Their premise that the study of simple circuits and behaviors has been slow to lead to any fundamental principles of neural function does an injustice to the biologists who work on these systems (2) . (ii) Their points are illustrated primarily with two examples taken from their own work in arthropods; we believe there are multiple interpretations of the functional and adaptational significance of their results. (iii) They contend that the adoption of an evolutionary perspective is necessary to "explain" many features of neuronal organization. Whereas nervous systems are clearly products of evolution, the direct study of living neural systems has been, and is, the best approach for elucidating unifying principles. As we cannot study ancient behavior or neural organization, we can only use data from extant species to deduce possible evolutionary processes. We cannot "explain" the production of behavior or principles of neural organization with evolutionary speculation.
The occurrence of serially homologous ffight interneurons in abdominally derived neural segments of the locust is indeed interesting. As was previously suggested (3) , this finding, combined with fossil evidence, may be consistent with the pleural-appendage theory of the evolution of insect flight. (4, 5) . In fact, even within some bird species there is individual variability regarding whether the hindlimb passes over or under the wing during head-scratching (4) . It would appear that some type of evolutionary modification has occurred in this system. Also, in birds that exhibit the reptilian type of headscratching, the wing may be held extended for some purpose (for example, greater balance) while the hindlimb is elevated. The authors did not suggest a selective advantage for self-awareness of mortality or musical ability in humans. The awareness of one's own mortality seems extremely adaptive in an organism whose reproductive abilities can span several decades, and a propensity toward musical ability would seem to be adaptive in an organism that is unique in its social and communicative orientation. We do not know that these traits are adaptive, or even whether they are "hardwired" in the human brain, but we cannot rule out such possibilities. To gain a better understanding of the forces that shape neural systems, we must have more comparative studies of invertebrate neural circuits aimed at identifying similarities and differences occurring at the order, family, and generic levels (6) First, the existence of such adaptive hypotheses does not in itself rule out alternative evolutionary explanations. As we stated in our article, it is never possible to exclude completely the possibility of any feature's having some functional significance. What we have argued is that, in the examples given, the available evidence fits the nonadaptive evolutionary hypotheses better than it fits the adaptive ones. While, for obvious reasons, we concentrated on the systems we know best, we did not restrict ourselves to these. In particular the existence of "motoneurons" with axons that do not connect with a muscle is unlikely to be adaptive (2) . Indeed, the segmental giant neuron in the escape circuitry of the crayfish has an apparently functionless, blind ending in the first root [see (3) for a discussion of the evolutionary significance of this feature].
Jones and Leise have not addressed the question of the relative value of altemative hypotheses, but merely suggested some new ones.
Second, even when a feature may be shown to have a function, this does not mean that it was adapted for that purpose. For example we argued that the flight interneurons in the locust, which clearly have a function, were originaly adapted for ventilation and only secondarily co-opted for use in the control of flight. We fail to see any circularity in the argument. The observations of (i) the undisputed morphological arrangement and abdominal origin of the interneurons and (ii) the lack of any obvious advantage for flight that this particular arrangement and origin might confer are best explained by the hypothesis that the organizational feature is preadaptive for flight as a result of wings originating according to the pleural appendage theory. The second observation is clearly open to dispute, but familiarity with the system allows one to rule out the possibility, along with many others, that the arrangement serves to introduce phase delays. The significance of such an argument is that, if current organization owes a substantial part of its makeup to prior history, then systems with different histories are likely to be substantially different; and general principles relating organization and function become more difficult to find.
Third, the generation of multiple altemative hypotheses is, in itself, a weak form of argument, since it implies that no single hypothesis has a high probability of being correct. Rather it demonstrates the inventiveness of the authors. It is because of this that we feel new hypotheses assigning adaptive value to the features we have described should be measured against consideration of how these circuits may have evolved.
In addition, Jones and Leise put forward adaptive hypotheses to counter our arguments for nonadaptive evolutionary processes, an approach that contradicts two statements they make elsewhere in the comment. They state that teleology has no place in the consideration of biological design, and yet their arguments for adaptive value of these neuronal circuits are implicitly teleological. Elsewhere they state "One must be cautious when speculating about the adaptive value of individual neurons or particular neuronal features." This is exactly the point we were trying to make in our article, but it seems to us inconsistent; with their earlier speculations of adaptive-value. Finally, Jones and Leise do not take into account the diverse processes controlling evolution. They call for more comparative studies (the value of which we discussed) in order to "comprehend how neural circuits are shaped by natural selection." Yet natural selection is only one of the many processes involved in evolution. Indeed, as we illustrated in figure 3 , neural circuitry is not directly accessible to natural selection; only the behaviors produced are. Jones and Leise allude briefly to the role of developmental processes in guiding evolution and to the potential value of seemingly functionless neurons as a source of variability for future change. But they do not mention that both these points are examples ofthe nonadaptive processes in evolution, whose importance we believe should be recognized, and that they are discussed in our article. The evolutionary arguments we used are well established in the literature (5) . In our article we tried to demonstrate their significance to the understanding of neuronal circuits. Jones and Leise appear to be saying that the use of such arguments should be restricted because they are, in their opinion, premature. This seems to us an unnecessary limitation of the framework for understanding the nervous systems of today, which are, after all, the products of evolution.
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